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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE
STATUTES GOVERNING INTERSTATE
ACQUISITIONS BY BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES: NORTHEAST BANCORP, INC.
V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Federal law governing the formation and activities of bank
holding companies (BHCs)' is principally embodied in the Bank
Holding Company Act (the Act).2 Section 3(d) of the Act, the
Douglas Amendment, prohibits BHCs from acquiring an interest in
any bank located in another state, unless such acquisition is specif-
1 See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982). A bank holding company (BHC) is generally de-
fined as "any company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or
becomes a bank holding company. . . ." Id. A company is deemed to have control over a
bank if: (1) it has control over at least 25% of the bank's voting securities, or (2) it controls
the election of a majority of directors or trustees of the bank, or (3) the Federal Reserve
Board determines that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence
over the management or policies of the bank. Id. § 1841(a)(2)-(c).
2 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982). Originally enacted as the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, this legislation was inspired by a desire to prevent the uncon-
trolled expansion of bank holding companies, to limit their ability to consolidate control of
banking facilities in a particular area, and to restrict their activity in non-banking enter-
prises. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2482, 2482-83. The Act represents a congressional attempt to apply the general pur-
poses of antitrust legislation-the promotion of competition and the prevention of monopo-
lization-as well as the general purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1933), ch.
89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)-the prevention of exces-
sive connections between banking and other businesses-to the field of banking and bank
holding companies. S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2385, 2386.
Ownership and control of any bank or bank holding company in excess of 5% of the
voting shares may not be obtained without prior approval of the Federal Reserve Board. See
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982). The Board may not approve any proposed acquisition that
would result in monopolization or a restraint of trade "unless it finds that the anticompeti-
tive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community
to be served." See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1982). For a general discussion of federal laws regu-
lating expansion of banks and bank holding companies, see P. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FED-
ERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW 86-93 (1976); Pitts & Cranmore, Considerations Under
the Federal Banking and Securities Laws with Respect to Bank Merger or TakeOvers, 36
OKLA. L. REv. 789, 791-813 (1983).
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ically authorized by the laws of that state.s Although this provision
effectively prevented all interstate acquisitions in the past,4 several
states recently have enacted statutes that authorize certain acqui-
sitions by non-domiciliary BHCs.5 Some of these statutes limit this
authorization to interstate acquisitions by BHCs with a home
state' that is located within a certain region and that has enacted a
reciprocal statute.7 Such statutes have been perceived as attempts
3 See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982). The Douglas Amendment states, in pertinent part:
[N]o application ... shall be approved under this section which will permit
any bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, any voting shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets of
any additional bank located outside the State in which the operations of such
bank holding company's banking subsidiaries were principally conducted on July
1, 1966, or the date on which such company became a bank holding company,
whichever is later, unless the acquisition ... is specifically authorized by the stat-
ute laws of the State in which such bank is located, by language to that effect and
not merely by implication.
Id.
The Amendment does not prohibit a non-domiciliary BHC from acquiring up to 5% of
the voting shares of a bank because such an acquisition does not require Board approval
under the Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1982); P. HELLER, supra note 2, at 71.
4 See H. HUTCmNSON, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 82 (5th ed.
1984). The Douglas Amendment, together with the McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224
(1953) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), effectively barred interstate banking for
many years. See H. HUTCHINSON, supra, at 82; see also DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GEO-
GRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES, reprinted in BANK
EXPANSION IN THE 80's: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & INTERSTATE BANKING 582 (1981) (McFad-
den Act and Douglas Amendment embody principles restricting interstate full-service bank-
ing and geographic expansion, and foster state control of multi-office structure). The Mc-
Fadden Act requires that national banks adhere to the branching laws of the state in which
their home offices are located and thereby substantially limits interstate banking. See H.
HUTCHINSON, supra, at 82. Many states allow branching only on a limited basis, such as
within a city or within a county, see id. at 84, and, until recently, most states did not allow
acquisitions of banks within their state by an out-of-state bank holding company. Thus,
interstate banking in both branch and holding company form was precluded. See id. at 87.
' See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.235(e) (Supp. 1983) (out-of-state bank may acquire
voting securities or capital stock of other bank if other is not recently formed); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 524.1805 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (registered bank with Federal Reserve which owns
at least two Iowa banks may acquire other banks); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013(2)
(Supp. 1984-1985)(prior approval of superintendent required for authorization); see infra
note 7; see also Pitts & Crannore, supra note 2, at 805 (various states amending laws to
allow interstate banking); Hawke, Are State Laws Permitting Interstate Banking Constitu-
tional?, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 1982, at 4 (states easing attitude toward entry by out-of-state
BHCs).
' See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982). For the purpose of any statute enacted by a state
under the authority of the Douglas Amendment, "the [s]tate in which the operations of a
bank holding company's subsidiaries are principally conducted," or the "home" state, "is
that [s]tate in which total deposits of all such banking subsidiaries are largest." Id.
7 See, e.g., 1983 Conn. Acts 83-411 (Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2
(West Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2 (Supp. 1984); see also 1984 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. ch.
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by the states to create regional banking systems, the constitution-
ality of which has been the subject of considerable debate.' Re-
cently, in Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System,9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that Massachusetts and Connecticut stat-
utes limiting non-domiciliary acquisitions to BHCs based in New
England states with reciprocal statutes 0 are constitutional,1' and,
84-42, § 658.295 (3)(a) & (4)(a) (West); GA. CODE § 41A-2802 (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 7-1-103(24) (Supp. 1984). New York allows acquisitions on a reciprocal basis, but does not
impose geographic limitations on acquisitions. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 142-b (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983).
8 Compare Hawke, Of Legal Bogs and New England Clam Chowder: A Rejoinder,
BANKING EXPANSION REP., March 7, 1983, at 1 (zones are not unconstitutional) and Hawke,
supra note 5, at 4 (favoring zones, though recognizing uncertainties regarding constitutional-
ity) with Golembe, Massachusetts Interstate Banking, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Jan. 17,
1983, at 1 (asserting that zones are unconstitutional and recommending elimination of all
state barriers).
- 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
10 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West Supp. 1983); 1983 Conn. Acts 83-411
(Reg. Sess.). The Massachusetts statute states in pertinent part:
[A]n out-of-state bank holding company... may establish or acquire direct or
indirect ownership or control of more than five percent of the voting stock of one
or more banking institutions or bank holding companies; provided that the laws of
the state in which operations of the subsidiary banks of such out-of-state bank
holding company are principally conducted expressly authorized, under conditions
no more restrictive than those imposed by the commonwealth ... the establish-
ment of the acquisition of direct or indirect ownership or control of more than five
percent of the voting stock of banks, or companies controlling one or more banks
in that state, by bank holding companies whose banking institutions principally
conduct their operations in the commonwealth. [T]he term "out-of-state bank
holding company". . . shall include only those companies which have their prin-
cipal place of business in one of the states of Connecticut, Maine, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island or Vermont ....
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 167A, § 2 (West Supp. 1983).
The Connecticut statute states in pertinent part:
Any New England bank holding company may... establish or acquire and retain
direct or indirect ownership or control of all or part of the voting stock of any
Connecticut bank ... or Connecticut bank holding company ... if the laws of
the state in which the operations of the subsidiary banks of such New England
bank holding company are principally conducted ... expressly authorized, under
conditions no more restrictive than those imposed by the laws of Connecticut...
the establishment or acquisition and retention of direct or indirect ownership or
control of all or part of the voting stock of banks. . . or bank holding companies
having their principal places of business in the state by Connecticut bank holding
companies.
1983 Conn. Acts 83-411 (Reg. Sess.).
11 The Northeast Bancorp court held that the statutes were consistent with the Com-
merce, Compact, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 740 F.2d at 208-10; see
infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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in fact, are exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny by the Douglas
Amendment. 2
In Northeast Bancorp, one Connecticut and two Massachu-
setts BHCs sought approval from the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (the Board) for proposed interstate merg-
ers with BHCs in Massachusetts and Connecticut, respectively.'3
Northeast Bancorp and Citicorp formally challenged the proposed
acquisitions, 4 alleging that the statutes were violative of the Com-
pact, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clauses.' 5 The Board, how-
2 See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13 See 740 F.2d at 204. The first of the proposed mergers was between Bank of New
England, a Massachusetts BHC, and CBT Corp., a Connecticut BHC. See id. The $10 bil-
lion combination was the largest proposed merger since the New England states had enacted
legislation allowing interstate acquisitions. See Carson, Conn., Mass., Banks Announce Big
Interstate Merger Plan, Am. Banker, June 14, 1983, at 1. Under the authority of the Con-
necticut statute, Bank of New England entered into a formal agreement to acquire CBT.
See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 205.
The second application, submitted by Hartford National Corp., a Connecticut BHC,
requested approval of a proposed acquisition of Arltru Bankcorporation, a Massachusetts
BHC. Id. at 204. This agreement was entered into under the authority of the Massachusetts
statute. Id. at 206; see Fraust, New England Interstate Merger Set: Hartford Nat'l to Buy
Arltru Bancorp, Am. Banker, Sept. 2, 1983, at 1 (discussion of details of merger plan).
The third application concerned the proposed acquisition of Colonial Bancorp, Inc., a
Connecticut BHC, by Bank of Boston Corp, a Massachusetts BHC. See Northeast Bancorp,
740 F.2d at 204; see also Forde, Bank of Boston, Colonial Bancorp Agree to Merger, Am.
Banker, Oct. 4, 1983, at 23 (details of merger plan).
24 See Hartford National Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353, 354 (1984); Bank of New Eng-
land Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 376 (1984); Bank of Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 524,
524 (1984). Citicorp and Northeast Bancorp responded to an invitation by the Board for
public comment on the merger. See Application Notice, 49 Fed. Reg. 6012 (1984) (notice of
Bank of Boston Corp. application); Application Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,172 (1983) (Hartford
National Corp. application); Application Notice, 48 Fed. Reg. 41,524 (1983) (Bank of New
England application).
15 See Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 380-81 (1984). Citicorp, a
New York BHC, reportedly challenged the three acquisitions because the statutes effectively
barred it from fulfilling its own acquisition objectives in Massachusetts. See Matthews, Cit-
icorp Eyes Massachusetts Acquisitions, Am. Banker, Dec. 8, 1983, at 1. Northeast Bancorp,
a Connecticut BHC, challenged only the application by the Bank of New England to acquire
CBT Corp. See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 205-06. It had previously brought an action
challenging the Connecticut law in the United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut, see Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Woolf, 576 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Conn. 1983), aff'd
mem., 742 F.2d 1439 (2d Cir. 1984), but the complaint was dismissed on the ground that
Northeast lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, 576 F. Supp. at
1234. Northeast claimed that the statute placed them at a competitive disadvantage by
prohibiting its planned merger with the Bank of New York while authorizing other Connect-
icut BHCs to merge with New England BHCs. See id. at 1229; Matthews, Northeast Chal-
lenges Fed Approval of Bank of New England-CBT Merger, Am. Banker, Mar. 30, 1984, at
11.
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ever, approved the acquisitions,"0 and, on appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed. 17
Writing for the court, Judge Bonsai held that the statutes
were not violative of the Compact Clause, asserting that the crea-
tion of a regional banking system would neither increase the politi-
cal power of the New England states nor impair the "just
supremacy" of the national government.'8 In addition, the Second
10 See Hartford National Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353, 354 (1984); Bank of New Eng-
land Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 376-77 (1984); Bank of Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull.
524, 525-26 (1984). The Board's constitutional analysis is contained in Appendix to the Or-
der Approving the Application of Bank of New England Corporation, Boston, Massachu-
setts, to Merge with CBT Corporation, Hartford, Connecticut, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 379, 379-
86 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Appendix]. Although the Appendix addressed the constitu-
tional issues relative to the Bank of New England petition and the Connecticut statute, the
constitutional analysis contained therein was determinative in the Board's review of the
other two applications. See Hartford National Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 354 (analysis in
Appendix applicable to Massachusetts statute and is basis for approval of petition); Bank of
Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 525 (constitutional analysis in Appendix determinative).
17 See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 210. Under § 9 of the Bank Holding Company
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1982), a "party aggrieved by an order of the Board" has the right to
appeal the order directly to the United States Court of Appeals in either the circuit in which
the party's principal place of business is located, or the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Id.
18 See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 209; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The Compact
Clause states that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress .... enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State ... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. An agree-
ment between states violates the Compact Clause if it is "directed to the formation of any
combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States." See Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893); see also United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434
U.S. 452, 471 (1978); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1976). The Compact
Clause has been limited to its literal meaning to avoid the total preclusion of agreements
between and among states. See Union Branch R.R. v. East Tenn. & G. R.R., 14 Ga. 327, 340
(1853) (cited in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 466-67
(1978), as the basis for the Compact Clause interpretation in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503 (1893)). Thus, not every agreement between states is subject to Compact Clause scru-
tiny. See United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 469. A violation of the Compact Clause will
occur only if an agreement entered into without congressional consent upsets the political
balance of the states in some manner, such as by relocating boundary lines, or by encroach-
ing upon the free exercise of the authority of the federal government. See Engdahl, Charac-
terization of Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a Compact?, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 63, 66-67 (1965) (discussing scope and analytical vices of rule enunciated in Virginia v.
Tennessee).
Reciprocal legislation, such as the statutes in question in Northeast Bancorp, though
not within the traditional form of an agreement or compact, may be violative of the Com-
pact Clause. See United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 470. Such enactments may subju-
gate federal supremacy through the enhancement of state power in much the same manner
as formal agreements. Id. at 470-71 (both formal and informal agreements are reached by
Compact Clause if they impact on federal structure).
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Circuit disagreed with the petitioners' claim that the statutes vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against non-
New England BHCs.19 The court determined that the disparate
treatment of the non-New England BHCs was rationally related to
the legitimate state purposes of fostering local banking institutions
and preventing their domination by large New York and Chicago
BHCs.2 °
Addressing the Commerce Clause issue, Judge Bonsal rea-
soned that, since the Douglas Amendment prohibits all interstate
acquisitions not authorized by state law, the Massachusetts and
Connecticut statutes actually permit a degree of interstate com-
merce where it otherwise would not exist.21 Moreover, the court
noted that Congress possesses the power to exempt certain state
statutes from Commerce Clause scrutiny22 and asserted that the
Douglas Amendment had effectively done so with respect to the
Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes. 23 The petitioners' argu-
ment that the Douglas Amendment merely allows states either to
permit absolutely or to bar unqualifiedly all non-domiciliary acqui-
sitions was refuted by Judge Bonsal's conclusion that permitting
interstate acquisitions on a limited basis is consistent with the lan-
guage and legislative history of the Amendment.24
I See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 209-10.
20 See id. at 209. In determining whether the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes
violated the Equal Protection Clause, Judge Bonsal applied the rational basis standard of
review. See id.; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTiONAL LAW 591 (2d ed. 1983).
Under this test, the court will not invalidate legislation if the classifications created by it
conceivably bear a rational relationship to any governmental purpose permitted by the Con-
stitution. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) (statutory classifications will be
"set aside ... only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them"); Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (whether legislation will promote state goal is
not in issue; concern is whether legislature "could rationally have decided" that the law
would achieve goal); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (legislation "will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it"). The Supreme
Court has applied this standard consistently in its analysis of classifications created by gen-
eral economic legislation. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 591; see, e.g.,
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
303 (1976). Furthermore, any legislation resulting in a classification that neither impinges on
a fundamental constitutional right, nor defines the relevant class through use of race, sex, or
other suspect characteristic, will be scrutinized under the rational basis standard. See G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 408 (1982); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980).
21 Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 207-08.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 See id. The court relied quite heavily upon statements of Senator Douglas, the spon-
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Proponents of regional banking have hailed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Northeast Bancorp as lifting the "cloud of uncer-
tainty" surrounding the constitutionality of state laws that restrict
interstate banking to particular regions.25 It is submitted, however,
that while the court's analysis of the Equal Protection issue was
adequate,28 its analyses of the Compact and Commerce Clause
questions were not sufficient to establish beyond doubt the consti-
tutionality of the statutes in question. 27 This Comment will ad-
sor of the amendment, that asserted that the provision was intended to permit acquisitions
by out-of-state BHCs "only to the degree that state laws expressly permit them... ." Id. at
207 (quoting 102 CONG. REC. 6858 (1956) (statement of Sen. Paul Douglas)). The court also
stressed that § 7 of the Bank Holding Company Act reserved to the states all the powers to
regulate BHCs previously possessed by the states. See Northeast Bancorp., 740 F.2d at 208;
see also 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1982).
25 See Fraust, Court Lifts Cloud Over Regional Interstate Laws, Am. Banker, Aug. 3,
1984, at 1. Proponents of regional banking have praised the Northeast Bancorp decision as
a clear indication that interstate banking is within the purview of state action. Id. at 5, col.
1. Many expect the ruling to inspire interstate acquisitions in New England and the South-
east, and to encourage other sections of the country to develop regional interstate plans. Id.
at 1, col. 4.
2 See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 209-10. Classifications created by economic leg-
islation will be deemed valid under the Equal Protection Clause if they bear a rational rela-
tionship to any legitimate governmental purpose. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text. It is submitted that the Second Circuit appropriately applied this standard of review
to the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes. The statutes are economic in nature, and
the distinctions created between New England and non-New England BHCs arguably bear a
rational relationship to the states' purported goals of fostering banking concerns that are
responsive to local needs. See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 209; Appendix, supra note
16, at 381; see also Iowa Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d 1288, 1294-96 (D.C.
Cir.) (Iowa statute limiting out-of-state acquisitions to BHCs that control two or more Iowa
banks on a specified date does not violate Equal Protection Clause because statute bore
rational relationship to state goal of ensuring presence of banks that serve local needs), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
It must be noted that the standards for reviewing state action under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause are much less stringent than those applied in Commerce Clause review. See
Appendix, supra note 16, at 385. A statute will survive Equal Protection scrutiny if it is
conceivable that its discriminatory scheme may promote some legitimate state end, whether
or not such an end is actually achieved. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 464, 466 (1981). The application of this less-than-stringent standard for compli-
ance with the Equal Protection Clause, it is submitted, enabled the Second Circuit easily to
dispose of the allegation that the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes create unconstitu-
tional classifications.
27 See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208-09. As noted by the Federal Reserve Board,
"an interstate agreement is within the parameters of the Compact Clause and thus requires
congressional consent only when: (1) an interstate compact or agreement exists, (2) that
tends to increase the power of the compacting states in such a manner as to interfere with
federal supremacy." Appendix, supra note 16, at 380 (citing United States Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978); Virginia v. Tennessee, 1,18 U.S. 503 (1893));
see infra note 29.
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dress shortcomings in the Second Circuit's abbreviated Commerce
Clause analysis and will suggest that the Douglas Amendment
lacks sufficient specificity to exempt the Connecticut and Massa-
chusetts statutes from traditional Commerce Clause review. In ad-
dition, it will be asserted that the reciprocity scheme contained in
the statutes, as well as the regional banking system the statutes
attempt to create, cannot survive appropriate Commerce Clause
scrutiny.
A reciprocity scheme, such as the one created by the Massachusetts and Connecticut
statutes, may be deemed an interstate agreement subject to Compact Clause scrutiny. See
United States Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 470; supra note 18. The history of the enactments
reveals a coordinated effort by the New England states to create a regional banking zone.
See Appendix, supra note 16, at 380.
Once it has been determined that the statutes are a compact or agreement, "the com-
patibility of [the statute] with the Compact Clause turns on whether Congress in the Doug-
las Amendment granted the states plenary power to regulate entry of out-of-state bank
holding companies, thereby renouncing a federal interest in such regulation .. " Id. In
United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978), the Supreme
Court determined that an interstate compact to facilitate the determination and collection
of state income tax from multistate businesses did not encroach upon federal supremacy in
the area of interstate commerce. See id. at 473. The Court determined that there was no
encroachment of federal power because no power was conferred upon the Multistate Tax
Commission that could not have been exercised by the states independently. See id. at 490
(W'hite, J., dissenting). However, in recognizing that reciprocal legislation might enhance
state power to the detriment of federal supremacy, the Court acknowledged that "the ab-
sence of an autonomous authority" cannot always be determinative. Id. at 491 (White, J.,
dissenting).
This Comment will establish that the Douglas Amendment does not authorize the re-
ciprocal banking statutes or the interstate banking zone that the statutes attempt to create,
see infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text, and will assert that the Massachusetts and
Connecticut statutes are void under the Commerce Clause, see infra notes 47-62 and accom-
panying text. It is suggested that the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes violate the
Compact Clause because they constitute an interstate agreement that exceeds state author-
ity to regulate interstate commerce, and, thus, interfere with federal supremacy in that area.
Had the Second Circuit properly determined that the Massachusetts and Connecticut stat-
utes were violative of the Commerce Clause, it is submitted that the court would have been
required to find a Compact Clause violation as well. If the attempt to create a regional
banking system through passage of reciprocal statutes is discriminatory and circumvents the
flow of commerce in the national marketplace, the enacting states have exceeded "permissi-
ble limits within the federal structure," and have exercised regulatory power that only Con-
gress may authorize. See J. NowA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 268. It must
be noted, however, that while a Compact Clause violation appears to arise naturally from
the Commerce Clause infirmity in this case, a court need not reach both issues since only
one basis of unconstitutionality is necessary to invalidate a statute. This Comment will,
therefore, focus on the Northeast Bancorp court's resolution of the Commerce Clause issue.
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THE DOUGLAS AMENDMENT-DOES IT EXEMPT DISCRIMINATORY
STATE STATUTES FROM COMMERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY?
Although the Northeast Bancorp court recognized that Com-
merce Clause issues were implicated in the case, the court con-
cluded that the Douglas Amendment constituted congressional au-
thorization for the regulatory scheme imposed by the
Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes, and thus determined that
the statutes were exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny.2" While
it is generally accepted that Congress may enact legislation author-
izing states to regulate interstate commerce in a manner that
would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause, e the Supreme
Court consistently has held that for Congress to do so, the federal
legislation must clearly and affirmatively authorize the state
regulation.30
2" See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208.
29 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2240 (1984);
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983); New
England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982); Western & S. Life Ins.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
30 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2242-43 (1984);
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982); New England Power Co. v.
New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,
427, 431 (1946).
In South-Central Timber, the Supreme Court considered whether federal law specifi-
cally authorized an Alaska statute requiring Alaskan timber to be processed within the
state. See 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2242 (1984). The Court held that the state regulation was in
conflict with the Commerce Clause and was not consented to by Congress. See id. The Court
noted that when such "consent has been found, congressional intent and policy to insulate
state legislation from Commerce Clause attack have been 'expressly stated.'" Id. (citing
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982)). The Court stated that while
there is "no talismanic significance to the phrase 'expressly stated,' . . . [t]he requirement
that Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise invalid state legislation is mandated by
the policies underlying [the] dormant Commerce Clause doctrine." South-Central Timber,
104 S. Ct. at 2242 (emphasis added).
In Sporhase, the Supreme Court undertook to determine whether federal legislation
authorized a Nebraska statute prohibiting the transportation of water to another state un-
less the receiving state had a reciprocal statute. 458 U.S. at 958-60. The Court concluded
that while 37 federal statutes and interstate compacts evidenced congressional deference to
state water laws, they did not indicate congressional intent to remove Commerce Clause
restraints on such laws entirely. Id. at 959-60.
The absence of an express authorization of regional reciprocal statutes in the Douglas
Amendment is apparent when Northeast Bancorp is compared with cases in which the
Court has found such express consent. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,
429-33 (1946). In Prudential, the Supreme Court determined that the McCarran Act, 15
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In its decision, the Federal Reserve Board conceded that the
Douglas Amendment apparently lacked the explicit authorization
generally required of federal statutes exempting state enactments
from Commerce Clause scrutiny.31 The Supreme Court has stated
in Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers, Inc. that "it is doubtful
that [the Douglas Amendment] authorizes state restrictions of any
nature on bank holding company activities. '32 However, both the
Board and the Second Circuit, when searching the legislative his-
tory of the Douglas Amendment for such an express authorization,
concluded that it must exist because nothing in the statute or the
legislative history appeared to prohibit it.3s It is suggested that the
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)), exempted
state regulation and taxation of the insurance business from Commerce Clause attack. See
328 U.S. at 429-33. The Act expressly stated that: the business of insurance was to be sub-
ject to state regulation; that congressional silence was not to be construed as a barrier to
state regulation or taxation; and that no act of Congress was to be construed as to "invali-
date, impair or supersede" any state provision that regulated or taxed such business. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (1945).
In White, the Supreme Court held that certain federal regulations, promulgated under
the authority of federal statutes, authorized an executive order of the Mayor of Boston that
all construction projects funded by local and federal funds were required to employ 50%
Boston residents. See 460 U.S. at 205-06, 213. The federal regulations governing the applica-
tion of the funds specifically provided that "[tihe maximum feasible employment of local
labor shall be made in the construction. . . projects receiving direct grants and loans ....
[E]very contractor ... shall be required to employ. . . qualified persons who regularly
reside in the designated area where such project is to be located . . . ." Id. at 214 n.11
(emphasis omitted) (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 305.54(a) (1982)). Thus, the Court concluded that
the federal regulations governing the program expressly and "affirmatively permitted the
type of parochial favoritism" found in the Mayor's executive order. See White, 460 U.S. at
213.
31 Appendix, supra note 16, at 384.
'2 447 U.S. 27, 47 (1980) (emphasis added).
3 See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208; Appendix, supra note 16, at 386. The
Northeast Bancorp court relied upon Iowa Indep. Bankers Assoc. v. Board of Governors,
511 F.2d 1288, 1296-97 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975), to determine that the
Douglas Amendment does not prohibit state statutes that discriminate against interstate
commerce. See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208. In Iowa Independent Bankers, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit extensively reviewed the legislative
history of the Douglas Amendment. See 511 F.2d at 1296-97. This inquiry was made to
determine if the Amendment conflicted with an Iowa statute that permitted acquisitions
only by those out-of-state BHCs that owned at least two banks in the state before a given
date. See id. at 1292, 1296. The petitioner had claimed that the state statute conflicted with
the Douglas Amendment, contending that, under the Amendment, states must "extend the
right to acquire in-state banks to all out-of-state bank holding companies, or. . .prohibit
such acquisitions entirely." Id. at 1296. Searching for preemptive force, the court deter-
mined that the Douglas Amendment contained no expression of congressional intent to pro-
hibit states from discriminating among out-of-state BHCs. Id. at 1296. This finding was
made strictly for the purpose of ascertaining any conflict between federal and state law. See
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court erroneously construed the silence of the Douglas Amendment
on the matter of regional reciprocal statutes. The mere conclusion
that there is an absence of a prohibition in a broadly worded stat-
ute does not of itself justify a determination that such a statute
affirmatively authorizes a specific type of state regulation of inter-
state commerce.3 4
In examining the legislative history, the Second Circuit relied
heavily upon statements by Senator Douglas, the sponsor of the
Amendment. 5 The Supreme Court, however, has recently stated
that congressional intent to exempt state statutes from Commerce
Clause constraints may not be implied from legislative history
when no such intent is expressly stated in the statute.3
id. at 1297.
It is submitted that the Iowa Independent Bankers court's analysis was complete once
it was determined that the Douglas Amendment did not preempt the limited acquisition
scheme contained in the Iowa statute. In Northeast Bancorp, however, the court could not
reach any conclusion based upon the absence of congressional prohibition of regional recip-
rocal statutes in the Douglas Amendment because it was required to find specific congres-
sional authorization for such limited non-domiciliary acquisitions. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
"I Compare Iowa Indep. Bankers Assoc. v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d 1288, 1296-97
(D.C. Cir.) (analysis of Douglas Amendment to find prohibition against state statute to as-
certain if federal law preempts), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975) with New England Power
Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340-43 (1982) (analysis of federal statute to find af-
firmative, express consent to state regulation to ascertain if Congress exempted state regula-
tions from Commerce Clause).
35 See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 207. During the Senate debate on the Bank
Holding Company Act, Senator Douglas stated:
What our amendment aims to do is to carry over into the field of holding compa-
nies the same provisions which already apply for branch banking under the
McFaddan Act-namely, our amendment will permit out-of-State holding compa-
nies to acquire banks in other States only to the degree that State laws expressly
permit them ....
102 CONG. Rc. 6858 (1956) (quoted in Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 207).
36 See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 342-43 (1982); supra
note 30; see also Note, Natural Resources-Constitutional Law, 23 NAT. REsouRCEs J. 933,
939 (1983) (congressional consent to otherwise impermissible state regulation cannot be im-
plied from legislative history, but must be expressly stated in statute). In New England
Power, New Hampshire argued that the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 792-824 (1982),
authorized state restrictions on the exportation of hydroelectric power. 455 U.S. at 344. The
state relied heavily upon an excerpt from the House debate in which the representative
from New Hampshire expressed hope that his state would not be denied its right to control
the export of power. Id. at 342 (quoting 79 CONG. REc. 10,527 (1935) (statement of Rep.
Rogers)). The Court, however, concluded that "[r]eliance on such isolated fragments of leg-
islative history in divining the intent of Congress is an exercise fraught with hazards, and 'a
step to be taken cautiously.'" New England Power, 455 U.S. at 342 (quoting Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977)). Chief Justice Burger concluded that "when Congress
has not 'expressly stated its intent and policy' to sustain state legislation from attack under
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The Second Circuit concluded that the Douglas Amendment
could not limit the power of the states to regulate interstate bank-
ing in degrees because section 7 of the Bank Holding Company
Act37 "reserves to the states the power and jurisdiction they pos-
sessed before [the act] was enacted."38 However, in Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc.,39 the Supreme Court, in examining the
validity of a Florida statute that discriminated against out-of-state
BHCs, determined that section 7 applies only to state legislation
that operates within the boundaries of the Commerce Clause.40 It
the Commerce Clause, we have no authority to rewrite its legislation based on mere specula-
tion as to what Congress 'probably had in mind."' New England Power, 455 U.S. at 343.
Indeed, the Federal Reserve Board in Northeast Bancorp conceded that the excerpts from
the congressional debate concerning the Douglas Amendment might be too "fragmentary
and unspecific to show congressional intent to authorize discrimination otherwise contrary
to the Commerce Clause .... ." See Appendix, supra note 16, at 385.
It is submitted that Senator Douglas' statement asserting that BHCs could make inter-
state acquisitions "to the degree that [s]tate laws expressly permit them," 102 CONG. REC.
6858 (1956); supra note 35, relied upon by the Second Circuit, see Northeast Bancorp, 740
F.2d at 207, is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. It is suggested that the
Senator was alluding to the fact that some states could allow acquisitions, while others could
refrain from doing so, thus constituting the "degree" to which states in general could permit
them. It is submitted, therefore, that the Senator's statement does not constitute definitive
evidence that Congress considered whether an individual state may permit acquisitions in a
limited manner. As the Board correctly indicated, the legislative history contains no discus-
sion of state power to discriminate between out-of-state BHCs, and evinces an overriding
congressional concern with the federal prohibition of interstate acquisitions, rather than the
manner in which states could lift such a ban. See Appendix, supra note 16, at 385.
37 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1982).
3 Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208 (footnote omitted). Section 7 of the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act states:
[the Act] shall not be construed as preventing any State from exercising such pow-
ers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to banks,
bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof.
12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1982). Although Congress and the courts have interpreted § 7 as granting
the states authority to impose more severe restrictions on BHC expansion than those im-
posed by the Act, see, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 48-49 (1980) (sec-
tion intended to preserve state regulations, even if more restrictive than federal law); S. REP.
No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1955), there are strong indications that state discrimina-
tory restrictions on expansions are not legally sustainable, see Shay, State Law Considera-
tions (Bank Holding Company Act, section 7), in BANK AcQuIsMoNs & HOLDING COMPANY
ExPANsIONs 510, 510 (1980); infra note 51 and accompanying text.
39 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
40 Id. at 49. The Lewis Court determined that the legislative history of § 7 evinces an
intent to forestall the development of state power to discriminate between local and foreign
BHCs. See id. The Court concluded that "§ 7 applies only to state legislation that operates
within the boundaries marked by the Commerce Clause." Id.
In 1955, while considering bank holding company legislation containing a provision
identical to § 7 of the Bank Holding Company Act, see H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8
(1955), the House Banking Committee determined that "[t]here is no constitutional basis by
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is submitted, therefore, that section 7 cannot be construed as an
indication that the Douglas Amendment specifically authorizes vio-
lations of the Commerce Clause by discriminatory statutes such as
those passed in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Thus, the neces-
sity for a traditional Commerce Clause review is not eliminated by
the Douglas Amendment.4'
APPLYING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO THE MASSACHUSETTS AND
CONNECTICUT STATUTES
The Commerce Clause traditionally has been construed not
merely as an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate in-
terstate commerce, but, in addition, as a limitation on state au-
thority to restrict such commerce.42 Indeed, in Northeast Bancorp,
the Federal Reserve Board recognized that two fundamental pur-
poses behind the Commerce Clause are the prevention of "eco-
nomic balkanization" and the development of the nation into a
single "federal free trade unit."4 s Therefore, the acquisition of
which a State could prohibit a corporation chartered in another State from owning or con-
trolling a national bank located within its borders." H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
7 (1955); see Shay, supra note 38, at 512.
41 Cf. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2243, 2246-47
(1984) (no congressional exemption exists, and traditional Commerce Clause analysis
applies).
42 See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981);
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35-36 (1980); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946); Northeast
Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 208; see also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319
(1852) (certain subjects of commerce power require exclusive federal legislation); W. RUT-
TLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 33 (1947).
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce "among the several
states," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, was never specifically examined at the Constitutional
Convention, and there exists no determinative legislative history to clarify the intent of the
Framers with regard to state authority to regulate interstate commerce, see J. NowAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 144-45.
"' See Appendix, supra note 16, at 381 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
325-26 (1979); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949)). "Balkaniza-
tion" is defined as the act of breaking up "(as a region) into smaller ineffectual and fre-
quently conflicting units." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENG-
LISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 166 (1976). In the context of trade, it has been described as the
erection of "barriers so high between the states that the stream of interstate commerce can-
not flow over them." H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 554 (1949) (Black,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Indeed, courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause in
light of the historical background that inspired its adoption; it has been viewed as a reaction
to the proliferation of state-imposed trade barriers and sanctions that caused economic
chaos under the Articles of Confederation. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26
(1979); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 20, at 145-46; see also Schwartz,
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BHCs across state lines and the state-imposed regulation of such
activities obviously present profound Commerce Clause implica-
tions.44 It is submitted that the Massachusetts and Connecticut
statutes, and the regional interstate banking system they en-
courage, are fundamentally inconsistent with "the Commerce
Clause's overriding requirement of a national 'common market.' "45
The protectionist policies underlying the regional restrictions im-
posed by these statutes are intended to foster the same type of
economic balkanization that the Commerce Clause was designed to
prohibit.4"
Per Se Unconstitutionality
State statutes effecting "simple economic protectionism" have
been declared per se violations of the Commerce Clause.4 7 A stat-
ute may be deemed to promote economic protectionism because it
Commerce, The States, and the Burger Court, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 409, 410-11 (1979) (inabil-
ity to stem rising tide of state protectionism led to rejection of Articles of Confederation and
adoption of Constitution); see generally C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrruON 567-
89 (1928) (recounting adoption of Commerce Clause at Federal Convention of 1787).
44 See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 38-39 (1980) (federal regulation of
banking industry is evidence of its interstate nature).
41 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).
46 Cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 381 (1976) (Mississippi re-
quirement that Louisiana sign reciprocity agreement or be foreclosed from exporting milk
into Mississippi creates preferential trade areas prohibited by Commerce Clause).
It is interesting to note that a Presidential report to Congress on the applicability of the
McFaddan Act and the Douglas Amendment advocated the abolition of all restrictions on
interstate banking, including those imposed by Congress. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREA-
SURY, GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON CoMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RE-
PORT OF THE PRESIDENT, reprinted in BANK EXPANSION IN THE 80's: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS &
INTERSTATE BANKING 569, 582-83 (1981). The report asserted that geographic boundaries
preclude pro-competitive market entry and undermine the competitive objectives they were
designed to achieve. See id. It also asserted that elimination of geographic constraints would
increase the range of financial services available to local communities without threatening
small banks or the stability of the banking system. See id. at 588. Although it was suggested
that Congress authorize regional banking systems as an interim step toward full liberaliza-
tion of bank expansion restrictions, see id. at 594, this suggestion has been criticized as a
delaying tactic and an attempt at "regional power grabs," see Presentation of Patrick J.
Mulhern in BANK EXPANSION IN THE 80'S: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS & INTERSTATE BANKING
598, 606-07 (1981).
47 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see, e.g., South-Central Tim-
ber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2247 (1984) (requirement of Alaska that logs for
export be processed locally falls within rule of per se invalidity); see Bacchus Imports, Ltd.
v. Dias, 104 S. Ct. 3049, 3055 (1984); cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 471 (1981) (state statute did not effect protectionism and thus did not warrant applica-
tion of per se rule).
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is determined to have either a discriminatory purpose or a discrim-
inatory effect.4 8 Considering the Connecticut statute, the Federal
Reserve Board noted that the discriminatory purpose of the stat-
ute "is apparent from [the] legislative history, which demonstrates
the intention of the Connecticut legislature to permit Connecticut
banks and bank holding companies to develop and consolidate on a
regional basis before having to compete with banks outside the re-
gion."' 49 In fact, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the legisla-
tures were motivated to enact the statutes by the desire to foster
local banks and prevent their domination by large New York and
Chicago BHCs.5 0 These goals are contrary to the well established
doctrine that states may not "build up [their] domestic commerce
by means of unequal and oppressive burdens upon the industry
and business of other States,"'" and, therefore, it is submitted, the
statutes are per se unconstitutional. It is suggested that even if the
statutes were not deemed protectionist, they could not be upheld
under less stringent standards of Commerce Clause review.52
48 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S. Ct. 3049, 3055 (1984); see, e.g., Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (discriminatory effect); Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977) (didtum) (discriminatory purpose).
,1 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 382 (citing The Report to the General Assembly of the State of
Connecticut to Study Legislation to Limit the Conduct of Business in Connecticut by Sub-
sidiaries of Bank Holding Companies, Jan. 5, 1983, at 10, 12-13; Transcripts of Connecticut
Senate Debate, May 18, 1983, at 60, 64, 70 (statement of Sen. Sullivan); Transcripts of Con-
necticut House of Representatives Debate, May 26, 1983, at 241, 258 (statement of Rep.
Onorato)).
An examination of the legislative history of a state enactment often will reveal a dis-
criminatory purpose. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S. Ct. 3049, 3055-56 (1984). In
Bacchus Imports, the Supreme Court determined that a Hawaii statute exempting certain
locally-produced liquors from state taxation constituted economic protectionism subject to a
declaration of per se unconstitutionality. See id. at 3056-57. The Court relied on the legisla-
tive history of the statute to determine the legislators' motives, and thus reveal the discrimi-
natory purpose of the statute. See id. at 3055-56. After determining that the legislators were
motivated by a desire to encourage and promote local industry, the Court concluded that
the disparate treatment of local and out-of-state liquors to achieve such ends was per se
violative of the Commerce Clause. See id. at 3056-57.
:0 See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 209.
51 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S. Ct. 3049, 3057 (1984) (quoting Guy v. Balti-
more, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880)); see also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 43-44
(1980) (state interest in bolstering local ownership or wealth conflicts with general principle
that Commerce Clause prohibits state regulation to shield residents from outside
competition).
52 See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
INTERSTATE BANKING
The Balancing Test
A non-protectionist state statute that impinges on interstate
commerce but allegedly advances legitimate state goals is scruti-
nized under the balancing test enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.5 - "Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its ef-
fects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits." '54 Once it has been deter-
mined that a legitimate local purpose is advanced by the statute,
the extent to which burdens on interstate commerce will be toler-
ated will "depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.15
5
In Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.,56 the Supreme
Court applied a Pike analysis to a Florida statute that prohibited
out-of-state banks and BHCs from acquiring Florida businesses
selling investment advisory services.57 The Court established that,
under Pike, statutory attempts to prohibit out-of-state BHCs from
acquiring in-state businesses are not evenhanded when locally
based BHCs are permitted to make similar acquisitions. 8 It is sug-
gested that the geographic restriction and the reciprocity scheme
contained in the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes involved
in Northeast Bancorp do not constitute an "evenhanded" regula-
tion, because under the statutes local BHCs are free to make ac-
quisitions, while BHCs from forty-four, non-New England states
are not.59
53 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); accord Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,
954 (1982) (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-
37 (1980) (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142); see Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). See generally Comment, Constitutional Law-Com-
merce Clause-Bank Holding Company Act- Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 26 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 1089, 10971102 (1981) (Supreme Court has frequently followed Pike approach
in Commerce Clause cases).
397 U.S. at 142.
5 Id.
Be 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
' See id. at 29, 42-44.
See id. at 42. The Lewis Court noted that the Florida statute discriminated "among
affected business entities according to the extent of their contacts with the local economy,"
and demonstrated "a local favoritism or protectionism that significantly alters its Commerce
Clause status." Id. (emphasis in original).
0" See Appendix, supra note 16, at 384. The Board recognized that the form of discrim-
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In deciding on the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes,
the Federal Reserve Board intimated that the enactment of the
statutes might have been motivated in part by a desire to maxi-
mize local control of banks, to discourage excessive concentration,
and to protect local residents from fraud. 0 Nevertheless, the
Board conceded that these arguably legitimate local concerns do
not justify the disparate treatment of non-New England BHCs.6
In addition, the discriminatory effect of the statutes is not justified
by these putative benefits because the same benefits could be at-
tained through other, less discriminatory measures.2
ination against interstate commerce effected by the statutes is unusual in that the statutes
do not discriminate against all states, but instead favor selected states. See id. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has declared state statutes to be unduly discriminatory even when those
statutes effectively discriminate against only a few states. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 348-50 (1977). In Hunt, a North Carolina
statute required all apples shipped into the state to bear the U.S. grade. See id. at 335.
Seven of the thirteen states that shipped apples to North Carolina used their own grading
systems, and were thus affected by the requirement. See id. at 349. The Court held that the
North Carolina provision particularly discriminated against apples produced in the State of
Washington by denying that state the unique competitive advantage it had earned through
employing inspection and grading standards that surpassed federal standards. See id. at
351. It is submitted that the North Carolina regulatory scheme in Hunt benefited not only
local apple producers, but also conceivably benefited other states using the less-stringent
federal standards when those states attempted to compete with superior Washington apples
in the North Carolina market. Analogously, it is submitted that the Massachusetts and Con-
necticut statutes are no less discriminatory because they discriminate against some states,
while benefiting others.
60 See Appendix, supra note 16, at 383. The Second Circuit recognized such local con-
cerns when it referred to the concern of the states over possible domination of local banks
by large BHCs from New York and Chicago. See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 209.
01 See Appendix, supra note 16, at 383 (citing Lewis, 447 U.S. at 43). In concluding
that the legitimate purposes of the state statute failed to justify the disproportionate bur-
den placed upon out-of-state BHCs, the Lewis Court found little support for the contention
propounded by the state that out-of-state BHCs presented a greater threat of monopoliza-
tion or of fraudulent practices than did local BHCs. See Lewis, 447 U.S. at 43. Therefore,
the Second Circuit's apparent acceptance of the rationale that large New York and Chicago
BHCs pose a greater threat to Massachusetts and Connecticut local banks and residents
than do BHCs from other New England states appears inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's determination in Lewis. See Northeast Bancorp, 740 F.2d at 209-10; see also DE-
PARTMENT OP THE TREASURY, GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 46, at 590-91 (relaxation of geographic restraints would actually
improve service to local communities and not threaten local banks).
62 See Appendix, supra note 16, at 383. The Board suggested that Massachusetts and
Connecticut could have accomplished their objectives in a non-discriminatory manner by
placing limitations on the total banking assets that a BHC could maintain in order to qual-
ify for acquisitions within the state. See id. It must be noted that existing federal antitrust
statutes already act to prevent monopolization by large BHCs. See Pitts & Cranmore, supra
note 2, at 795. In addition, § 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)
(1982), prohibits the Board from approving acquisitions that would result in monopoly or in
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Thus, it is submitted, that under the standards explicated in
Pike, the Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes appear to violate
the Commerce Clause, whether or not the enactments arguably ad-
vance legitimate state goals.
CONCLUSION
The resolution of the constitutional questions presented in
Northeast Bancorp will profoundly affect the future of the bank-
ing industry in the United States. The vagueness of the congres-
sional intent behind the Douglas Amendment, as well as the Su-
preme Court precedent requiring an express statement of
congressional authorization for state enactments to interfere with
interstate commerce, cast doubt on the Second Circuit's determi-
nation that the Douglas Amendment immunizes the Massachusetts
and Connecticut statutes from attack under the Commerce Clause.
Without specific authorization, the Massachusetts and Connecticut
statutes and other statutes that similarly create regional banking
systems, fail to withstand traditional Commerce Clause scrutiny.
Therefore, absent resolution by the Supreme Court or congres-
sional intervention in the form of a clarifying amendment to the
Douglas Amendment, the banking community and the many states
contemplating enactment of similar legislation cannot act with a
sufficient degree of certainty.
Peter Marullo
a substantial lessening of competition. See id.
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